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Abstract. An institutional perspective is employed to illuminate the complexity of frauds in various 
diverse economies, in order to enhance the efficacy of previous accounting concepts. In this study, 
the effects of the legal, regulatory and human framework of the strength of auditing and reporting 
standards, and the governance capital related to global sustainable competitiveness and economic 
growth, etc. are analysed by linear regression (OLS) methods. Moreover, the role of other indicators 
i.e. financial freedom, the extent of director liability and legal origin, are interrelated with the num-
ber of fraud cases. From the results, it appears that an increased level of governance capital, financial 
freedom from government pressure, strengthened transparency and more protected minority in-
vestors through liable directors might increase the number of reported fraud cases in the countries 
and years examined. The existence of legal origin also seemed to be an appropriate proxy for an 
improved understanding of fraud characteristics. This evidence suggests it is worth investigating in 
depth the nature of financial crimes across countries for a better understanding of this phenomenon. 
In this way, these findings might have sufficient potential in the case of adequate policy implications 
within a less litigious business environment to resolve the undesirable consequences of impending 
financial downturns, and to achieve sustainable competitiveness and economic development.
Keywords: sustainable governance capital, private institutions, legal origin, fraud, cross-country 
analysis, accountability.
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Introduction
Fraud generally refers to any deliberate act or omission designed to cheat others which results 
in the victim suffering damage or the perpetrator gaining an advantage (European Court of 
Auditors, 2017). Nevertheless, fraud also includes any deliberate act which deprives people 
of their property by guile, deception, or other prejudicial means (ACFE, 2016). Meanwhile, 
there is a constant gap between detected and hidden cases, where fraudulent activity is sus-
pected but not proven. Because of its nature, it is complicated to measure the level of fraud. 
Fraud cases are unique and are sometimes described as “snowflakes” in that none of them 
are similar, and each one has to be treated as a distinct event (Singleton & Singleton, 2010).
However, frauds can be explicitly understood using the notion of general deviant behav-
iour or antisocial attitudes (Morales, Gendron, & Guénin-Paracini, 2014). A person com-
mitting any financial crime, e.g. asset misappropriation, financial statement manipulation, 
earning management, or unfair executive compensation, can break the law or violate the 
trust of business partners (Becker, 1963). Moreover, contrary to the explanation of white-
collar crime as an act of individuals, an extended discussion of fraud includes the internal 
organizational environment (micro-sociological) and external (macro-sociological) factors 
(Free, 2012). This perspective involves a socio-political view of fraud, as a violation of rules 
that society considers appropriate.
The development of the conceptual framework of fraud broadens its micro (perpetrator-
centric) focus by elaborating macro-level reasoning, and encompassing the business environ-
ment which can affect its (non)occurrence. This point of view is believed to be more reliable 
in understanding perpetrators’ motivations and designing deterrence and control (Mailley, 
2015). Consequently, reported fraud cases do not occur in isolation. Instead, the process of 
detection and deterrence from individual to firm and institutional level, as the firm performs 
its responsibilities to stakeholders, is also taken into account (Bradshaw, 2014). 
Although Furlan, Vasilecas, and Bajec (2011) express doubts that international compari-
son will ignore the specifics of the local business environment, the previous empirical results 
make it possible to determine the objective of enterprise development, quantitative and quali-
tative strategies, accounting (IFRS) standards, etc. for industry leaders (Korzh, Mostenska, 
& Bilan, 2017). Kliestikova, Misankova, and Kliestik (2017) also concluded that the existing 
research into legal systems in the context of sustainable social development has shown that 
there is a correlation between the quality of insolvency law and the dynamic of the economic 
development of society. 
Meanwhile, there is still a dearth of theoretical and empirical explorations of links be-
tween financial reporting misconduct and macroeconomic circumstances, with different re-
sults. However, economic crises directly affect the reporting quality of organizations (Povel, 
Singh, & Winton, 2007). Thus, the internal monitoring mechanism of firms is also shaped by 
external frames, i.e. by the rule of law, enforcement agencies, and financial reporting practices 
(Amiram et al., 2018).
This research study aims to contribute to the literature by discussing the theoretical foun-
dations of fraud by applying the already existing and somewhat outdated Fraud Triangle, 
Fraud Diamond and Planned Behavioural theories and then investigating the effectiveness 
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of these perspectives by taking into consideration the further ideas of New Institutional Eco-
nomics and the view of the American Dream Theory of financial crimes. The significance of 
this perception is that it enables to describe the complexity of accounting frauds in various 
countries, and is compatible with the trends observable in international efforts to improve the 
success of forensic accounting. Moreover, fraud is a multidimensional phenomenon, which 
may not necessarily be related to a genuinely “all-inclusive” theoretical framework (Lokanan, 
2015). Malíková and Brabec (2012) also highlighted the role of accounting legislation in dif-
ferent countries and the influence of macroeconomic factors on financial statements.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the concep-
tual evolution of forensic fraud literature. In the third section, the characteristics of various 
institutional and control variables are also described. In the following section, linear regres-
sion (OLS) analyses are carried out with cross-country data in order to analyse how account-
ability, governance capital, legal origin, financial freedom from government control, etc. can 
influence the number of fraud cases. After considering policy implications, brief conclusions 
are summarized in section 5. Finally, suggestions for further research are outlined from this 
perspective, i.e. research related to attempts to enhance the quality of sustainable governance 
across different states for the enhanced detection of financial crimes over time.
1. Theoretical framework
In this theoretical section, numerous conceptual frameworks are investigated, in order to 
understand why the unethical behaviour of managers leads them to commit business fraud. 
Besides the complementary concepts of the Fraud Triangle, the Extended Diamond, and the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour, in this paper, the new institutional economics approach will 
be integrated to explain the background of corporate accounting frauds.
The origin of the Fraud Triangle Theory (FTT) arose in the study of Sutherland and 
Locke (1936), in which the notion of “white-collar” crime was first defined. This idea was 
later developed and discussed by Cressey (1953), who argued that each fraud case has at 
least three mutual features used to identify it. One of the fundamentals of the FTT is the 
opportunity available to employees to commit fraud. The second is pressure, which is often 
the core reason why some people tend to steal and others do not. The incentives to theft can 
include private debt, business losses, and pre-existing ethical standards. The final element of 
the triangle is the rationalization (attitude) adopted by the perpetrator to justify the crime. 
These three conditions are generally present when frauds occur (ACPAA, 2002). The Finan-
cial Statement Audit, Section 99 of Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) provides direc-
tions for auditors when ensuring the accountability of an audit to obtain sound declarations 
regarding financial statements.
The most frequent factors which lead to an increased risk of fraud are identified by Co-
hen, Ding, Lesage, and Stolowy (2010). The incentive (pressure) is the result of a high degree 
of competition to obtain balanced debt or equity financing. Thus, the profitability expecta-
tions of institutional investors and other parties are also highlighted, along with the presence 
of financial interests related to the stock price, the financial state of the firm or cash flow 
forecasts, etc. The opportunity element arises from an ineffective board of directors or audit 
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commission, the dominance over management by a small group and dominant financial pres-
ence in, or ability to control, an industrial sector, etc. The rationalization element is based on 
an excessive interest (attitude) on the part of the management in enhancing stock prices, or 
the directors’ practice of requiring that unrealistic predictions be achieved.
The original Fraud Triangle concept has been augmented by fraud prevention and detec-
tion. In the Fraud Diamond Theory (FDT), individual “capability” was added as an extra 
element to the three initial elements (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). However, the existence of 
skills and distinct abilities are not merely a matter of specific circumstances; a perpetrator 
should also have the specific personality traits needed to commit fraud. Rudewicz (2011) 
identified that an individual’s position or function within the organization may provide an 
opportunity for fraud. In addition, the fraudster must be intelligent enough to recognize − 
and creative enough to exploit − internal flaws of control and has authorized access to use to 
his/her advantage. The individual should also have a resilient ego and self-confidence, driven 
by the failure to detect all activities. Thus, a fraudster can coerce others to go along with 
fraud by his/her credible behaviour. Finally, in order to avoid fraud detection, convincing lies 
and factual stories are offered to distract from the fraudster’s behaviour. These experimental 
models have been criticized because they do not provide a complex phenomenon but only 
a single and limited physiological aspect of the primary perpetrator of the deception (W. S. 
Albrecht, C. Albrecht, & C. C. Albrecht, 2008).
Another complementary theoretical outlook, the Theory of Planned Behavior, intends to 
understand potential managers’ unethical behaviour as observed in fraud cases. The attitudes 
(rationalization) corner of the Fraud Triangle and Diamond is perhaps the most important 
element for auditors to assess. The TPB is an extension of the original “Theory of Reasoned 
Action”, which only included the elements of attitude and subjective norms (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). The additional dimension of the TPB - emphasizing the role of intentions - 
involves behaviours of different kinds that can be anticipated with a high degree of accuracy 
from attitudes toward behavioural and subjective norms and perceived control, and the ex-
act nature of these relationships (Ajzen, 1991). From this socio-psychological perspective, 
an attitude refers to the degree to which an individual has a (un)favourable evaluation or 
appraisal of the behaviour in question (Bailey, 2006). Beck and Ajzen (Beck & Ajzen, 1991) 
related the TPB to the prediction of dishonest actions by personal feelings of moral obliga-
tion or behavioural norms. The range of fraud behaviour theories has been integrated by 
Cohen et al. (2010), and their analysis suggests that personality traits appear to be a major 
individual fraud-risk factor. However, Gillett and Uddin (2005) find that the extended TPB 
model describes the intentions of fraudulent reporting worldwide.
As a result of the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the causes of fraud, there 
is no reason to rely on fraud triangle, diamond or any existing behavioural, etc. model being 
able to explain the occurrences of corporate frauds (Lokanan, 2015). Because of the extensive 
nature of fraud, auxiliary approximations need to be presented that can support international 
judgements in order to expand the efficacy of the concepts discussed.
In order to demonstrate further insights into fraud theories, researchers are required to 
emphasize in detail not only the distinct influences which support fraud but also other eco-
nomic, financial and social issues (Free, 2015). The social-economic dimensions (economic, 
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political and cultural) of the activity are implicitly included in the context of the institu-
tion and society that gives structure and meaning to fraud (Fairclough, Graham, Lemke, & 
Wodak, 2004). Cieslewicz (2012) also stated that fraud is a global phenomenon and differs 
across countries. Others also prefer to combine psycho-, socio- and criminological theories. 
Ramamoorti (2009) announced the so-called Bad Apple, Bad Bushel, or Bad Crop Syndrome 
(ABC) of white collar crime to appreciate the incidence of fraud from a contextual perspec-
tive. These insights imply a multidisciplinary paradigm for research, such as the individual 
personality characteristics of those who commit fraud, the group dynamics of collusive be-
haviour and the larger cultural-societal (macro) factors that enhance or permit crimes.
Moreover, Choo and Tan (2007) clarified the theoretical background of corporate execu-
tive fraud by relating the fraud triangle to the concept of the American Dream Theory (ADT). 
The ADT of crime is based on the idea that incentives for crime do not only derive from the 
flaws, failures, or free choices of individuals (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2013). A broad explana-
tion of law-breaking must be considered by understanding the socio-cultural environments 
of people’s daily lives. The outcome is a pronounced strain toward institutional anomie, with 
a tendency for social norms to lose regulatory force. Recent challenges to one of the main 
premises of American exceptionalism concerning high rates of serious crime are an ordinary 
result of U.S. social institutions and cultural beliefs. Hence, the lack of norms, as a pre-
accepted bound on conduct in a society, can lead to executive fraud cases. In this perspec-
tive, four social institutions are distinguished, i.e. the family, the education system, the polity 
(political system), and the economy. The family undertakes the responsibility for the care of 
reliant persons and provides emotional support. The education system transmits knowledge 
to prepare the young for the demands of occupational roles. The polity protects members of 
society, allowing them to attain collective goals, and the economy supports the production 
and distribution of goods and services. A better understanding of corporate executive fraud is 
possible by involving three crucial features of the American Dream Theory: intense emphasis 
on monetary success, corporate executives disregarding regulatory controls, and corporate 
executives justifying (rationalizing) fraudulent behaviour that supports the occurrence of 
serious crime at a higher rate than in other developed countries (Choo & Tan, 2007).
The nature of institutions in economics has been the focus of New Institutional Econom-
ics (NIE). In this perspective, institutions are the human-devised constraints on interac-
tion, which are made up of both formal (rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints 
(norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement 
characteristics (North, 1994). However, although much empirical research in the social sci-
ences has examined the influence of institutions, no clear conceptual consensus seems to 
exist on what kind of characteristics and effects they have in relation to accounting fraud. In 
recent years, attention has been focused on the concept of coercing, as one form of political 
institution that reliably requires the state to honour economic and political rights (Weingast, 
1995). Moreover, “…the concept of freedom demands no more than that the coercion of 
supplementary individuals’ coercion and violence, fraud, and deception, etc. needs to be 
prevented. An exception [is made] for the use of coercion by the government for the sole 
purpose of enforcing known rules intended to secure the best conditions under which the 
individual may give his activities in a coherent, rational pattern …” (Hayek, 1960).
Fo
r 
pp
rov
l
6 D. Máté et al. The effects of accountability, governance capital, and legal origin on reported frauds
In addition, private enforcement is one of the major areas in which the law seeks to 
regulate the approval process (Djankov, Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). From this 
perspective, the courts can void a transaction when an agreement is fraudulent, merely un-
fair, made in bad faith, or involves a conflict of interest and harms the corporation’s financial 
situation. The state of financial market development is another important factor encouraging 
transparency. Zysman (1983) claimed that a developed stock market needs resilient auditing 
and reporting standards. According to El Ghoul, Guedhami, Pittman, and Rizeanu (2016), 
the role of the choice of an auditor in debt maturity is concentrated in companies from 
states with superior legal institutions governing property and creditor rights. Others have 
also suggested that experts within the accountancy profession are responsible for adjust-
ments in the strength of auditing and reporting (Nobes, 1983). On the other hand, Hronsky 
and Houghton (2001) argued that the more experienced the accountants of a country, the 
more durable will be the strength of auditing activities and the more likely frauds are to 
be reported. Meanwhile, corporate ethics and accountability can underlie the strength of 
the private infrastructure by specifying the credibility of the features of financial statements 
(Boolaky, Krishnamurti, & Hoque, 2013).
H1: A higher level of auditing and accounting standards is positively related to reported 
fraud cases.
Additionally, firms with sustainable business practices will be more expected to cooperate 
with the societies in which they operate. Consequently, the concept of corporate sustainabil-
ity indirectly includes the capable management of the social, environmental and economic 
aspects of the business. It includes balancing stakeholder expectations with assessments of 
social and environmental risk, the adoption of practices and behaviour, and the ability to 
produce perceived levels of quality products and services. In this sense “Governance for 
Sustainability” confirms appropriate management practices by harmonizing the expectations 
of society (Santos, Barbosa, & Gai, 2010). The environmental framework in which society 
exists and businesses operate is developed, maintained and updated by authorities and insti-
tutions, most often government bodies. The effectiveness of “sustainable” governance capital 
is a reflection of the economic, historical and legal background of a country, as well as of that 
of the business environment. The distinctive characteristics of sustainability that need to be 
managed are bribery and corrupt practices, which apply to all of a firm’s employees, as well 
as all activities related to the importance of business ethics.
H2: The increased level of governance capital is positively associated with reported frauds.
Nevertheless, the objective of economic freedom is not merely an absence of government 
coercion or control, but the preservation of a mutual sense of freedom (Miller & Kim, 2014). 
A prudent and efficient financial regulatory system ensures - via disclosure requirements 
and sovereign auditing – the transparency and integrity of forensic information. From this 
standpoint, the enforcement of law maintains the appearance of integrity by offering credible 
financial reports or testimony (M. Friedman & R. Friedman, 1980). Meanwhile, centralized 
financial regulation of the regime can weaken the pledge of transparency and reliability in 
financial markets and also impede their efficiency by limiting the effects of competition. 
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From this point of view, comprehensive studies of the literature have demonstrated that pub-
lic and private institutions influence the transparency of auditing and reporting by including 
the governance, economic, legal and social infrastructure (D. F. Meyer & N. Meyer, 2017).
H3: Advanced financial freedom results in an increased number of reported fraud cases. 
David and Brierley (1985) argued that the nature and effectiveness of a nation’s legal 
origin impacts on the regulatory system of accounting. The strength of the regulation of 
self-dealing in the common law countries (i.e. those with an Anglo Saxon legal system) is 
based on the sensitive inspection of transactions involving related parties before approving 
them, rather than favouring litigation by minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). Accordingly, the political infrastructure and legal environment can 
affect the strength of accounting and auditing quality in a country (Doupnik & Salter, 1993). 
Based on the literature discussion above, the contribution of the strength of auditing to the 
level of fraud will be analysed in a cross-country perception. Consequently, the current study 
forms the following hypotheses:
H4: Common law countries seem to have more reported fraud cases than civil law ones.
2. Data and methodologies
In order to check the validity of the model specifications, it will be simultaneously tested by 
the samples of fraud cases reported by ACFE in the year 2014 and 2016. The estimations 
are constructed by Ordinary Linear Regression (OLS) models (Equation 1) with heterosce-
dasticity consistent and robust (HAC) standard errors, in which the disturbances have the 
same variance across all observation points (White, 1980). Hence, models do not contain 
heteroscedastic residuals. The number of fraud cases in logarithm in a country [i] can be 
described as defined by Long and Ervin (2000):
1 2 3( )ln i o i i iFraud lnAuditing lnGovernance lnFreedom= β +β +β +β +
            4 5 6 7 ,_i i i i ilnLiability DOrigin DCivil law lnGDPβ +β +β +β + Ɛi ,             (1)
where, ln(Fraud) – denotes the number of fraud cases (ACFE, 2016). Enterprises come un-
der stress through numerous economic and financial risks to their success which appear in 
altered forms and degrees. Cases of fraud are just one of the events that each business entity 
can suffer. The independent Association of Certified Fraud Examiners has published the 
Reports to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (ACFE) bi-yearly since 1996. For 
this study, the reported fraud cases have been collated from the two earlier (2014 and 2016) 
available reports.
ln(Auditing) − (1 worst − 7 best) is the variable of the strength of auditing and reporting 
standards (SARS), which is considered a vigorous element of institutional transparency for 
businesses, stakeholders, and also governments. The international accounting standards (US 
GAAP and IFRS) play a crucial role in improving the value of transparency and the reliability 
of auditing at the country level. This variable, as one of the accountability pillars, is based on 
data collected from the Global Competitiveness Report issued (2014 and 2016) annually by 
Fo
ap
pro
va
l
8 D. Máté et al. The effects of accountability, governance capital, and legal origin on reported frauds
the WEF (World Economic Forum, 2018). Boolaky et al. (2013) revealed that the institutional 
infrastructure, i.e. ethical behaviour in connection with public officials, politicians, and other 
businesses, and the efficiency of the legal framework and corporate boards in challenging 
regulations, all jointly influence a country’s SARS. Consequently, some additional aspects, 
such as auditors’ responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud, financial market 
development (the level of sophistication, securities and exchange regulations) and the higher 
level of educational attainment and training (enrolment and reliance on professional manage-
ment) are related to the complexity of SARS.
ln(Governance) – the Sustainable Competitiveness Sub-Indices aim to evolve a broader 
picture of competitiveness that incorporates the essential pillars of an economy to enable 
sustainable economic growth and wealth to continue (Running, 2014). Governance capital 
focuses on regulating national development. Besides the given natural capital of a country, 
society and the economy need to be shaped by the legal, regulatory and human-created 
framework. Certain aspects of the implications for governments make up the Governance 
Sub-Index of Sustainable Competitiveness. These include financial stability, corruption, hu-
man rights and freedom of the press, etc., which are all aspects that shape the framework 
of a society, and act as proxies of sustainable competitiveness, to obtain and compare cross-
country perspectives. This regulatory and infrastructural framework also provides the natu-
ral, social and intellectual capital resources that can be nurtured to generate new resources 
and sustain existing wealth. According to the observations, Ireland leads in governance rank-
ings (with a score of 68.7, see Figure 1), followed by the Czech Republic; in the last place is 
Kiribati (22.7). This figure also highlights a clear North-South gap between American and 
European countries and African countries. 
Figure 1. Observations on governance capital extent to global sustainable competitiveness rankings 
by country in 2016 (source: author’s compilation, based on Sol Ability, 2018)
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ln(Freedom) – This indicator of financial freedom stands for banking efficiency, as an 
indicator of independence from government control and interference in the financial sector. 
The unduly high level of state ownership of banks and other financial intermediaries, such 
as insurance and capital markets, reduces competition and commonly reduces free access to 
credit. Preferably, there should be a minimum level of government interference, independent 
central bank supervision, and the regulation of financial institutions should be restricted to 
imposing contractual obligations. The aggregate level of financial freedom guarantees ef-
ficient access to financial opportunities for both people and businesses in the economy. An 
overall value on a scale of zero (worst) to 100 (best) is given to financial freedom, although 
the minimal regulation of financial institutions may extend beyond the prevention of fraud. 
This index is equally weighted and averaged to produce an inclusive Index of Economic Free-
dom for each economy and each year examined (2014 and 2016) by the Heritage Foundation 
(Miller & Kim, 2014).
D(Origin) – embodies the dummy variables that classify the major types of legal origin 
of each country. Here, the categories of the origins of law are English, French, German, and 
Nordic, as the control of dummy trap (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). For instance, 1 = 
English and 0 = otherwise, etc. The two main types of legal origin are civil and common; 
mixed law countries are substituted by the D(Civil_Law) dummy. 1 = Civil law and 0 = oth-
erwise. Respectively, Ɛ is the requested error term in this model.
ln(Liability) – the control variable of liability is the extent to which minority investors 
are protected; the director liability index has seven elements and ranges from zero (worst) to 
10 (best). A score of 0 is assigned if they cannot be held liable, or can be held liable only for 
fraud, with higher values indicating a greater liability of directors (Doing Business, 2017). 
The maximum value implies that derivative suits are available for stockholders holding 10% 
of share capital; the prejudicial transaction is duly approved and disclosed. Thus, holding 
other directors liable, a plaintiff should prove that directors acted carelessly and must pay 
damages and show that they are not required to pay out their profits. These directors will 
not be fined nor imprisoned and disqualified. Moreover, a prejudicial transaction cannot be 
voided based on director liability. This sub-index of Protecting Minority Investors is repre-
sented by the Doing Business database of the World Bank (World Bank, 2019).
ln(GDP) – denotes the log of GDP (at constant 2010 US$ prices). This control variable 
of economic growth (GDP at purchaser’s prices) is the amount of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy with product taxes and subsidies not included in the value 
of the products. This indicator is intended without deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or the depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are converted from do-
mestic currencies using the 2010 official US exchange rates in the year 2014 and 2016 (The 
World Bank, 2019).
3. Results of the regression analysis
Table 1 displays standard descriptive statistics (i.e. mean, median, standard deviation, C.V., 
and skewness, etc.) of the regression variables. Especially within cross-country specific data, 
the observations are expected to be independent of the same distribution. Hence, each of the 
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variables is transformed by a natural logarithm (ln) in order to increase the validity of the 
associated statistical examinations (Feng et al., 2014).
The influence of the listed independent variables on the number of fraud cases is analysed 
from a cross-country specific perspective in the regression models. Table 2 and Table 3 de-
note the consistent results of the approximations (Models 1 to 10) with the heteroscedasticity 
robust and corrected (OLS) regressions. The significant F-tests statistics are verified on the 
results of the preferred linear regression models and confirm the robustness of the selected 
specifications. In the bottom section of these tables, the multi-collinearity amongst the inde-
pendent variables is tested by the variance of the inflation factor (VIF). The reported values 
for each coefficient ranged from a low of a minimum of 1.00 to a high of 8.47, suggesting 
that the VIF values are at adequate levels. In the current study, the normality (c2) test of the 
residuals proved that (p > 0.01) the statistics are at an acceptable level.
In each reported case, the association of the strength of auditing is robust and has signifi-
cant positive t-statistics. These results indicate that the perceived responsibility of auditors 
positively affects the detection procedures of fraud and exhibits a significant accountability 
relationship. Hence, hypothesis H1 can be accepted. 
An increase in the level of the governance capital variable also tends to increase reported 
fraud cases. In this perspective, balanced government spending, the availability and qual-
ity of public services, and the improved legal framework of business in term of regulation 
seem to affect reported fraud cases positively. These pieces of evidence suggest it is worth 
investigating in depth, for example, the quality and the extent of governance to enhanced 
competitiveness in the case of specific country groups in order to better understand this 
complex phenomenon. Hypothesis H2 can be accepted. 
Meanwhile, financial freedom ratios are also positively correlated (in the year 2014) with 
fraud. If there is a one unit increase in the level of financial freedom from government con-
trol, then the number of reported fraud cases seem to increase. These results are comparable 
with the results of Sadaf, Oláh, Popp, and Máté (2018). In their study, they established that 
an increased level of efficient governance − e.g. the perceptions of the quality of public and 
civil service, the degree of freedom from political burdens, the quality of government policy 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of Equation (1) variables (source: calculations based on ACFE, 2016; Sol 
Ability, 2018; The World Bank, 2019; World Economic Forum, 2018)
Variables/
Statistics ln(Fraud) ln(Auditing) ln(Governance) ln(Liability) ln(Freedom) ln(GDP)
Mean 1.625 1.539 3.858 1.401 3.931 25.584
Median 1.386 1.538 3.901 1.609 3.912 25.863
Minimum 0 0.901 3.427 0 2.302 20.783
Maximum 6.945 1.898 4.136 2.197 4.499 30.461
S. deviation 1.289 0.184 0.168 0.711 0.415 2.003
C.V. 0.792 0.119 0.043 0.507 0.105 0.078
Skewness 1.034 –0.335 –0.714 –0.946 –1.681 0.026
Ex. kurtosis 1.737 0.254 –0.224 –0.344 3.634 –0.501
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implementation, and the credibility of commitment to it - might increase the number of 
reported fraud cases in various states examined. Hypothesis H3 can be accepted.
The results also indicate that legal origin, as a political institution, is one of the elements 
examined which similarly affect the number of fraud cases. Although each of the legal ori-
gin dummies (English, French, German and Civil Law) were statistically significant (except 
Model 8), the Anglo-Saxon one was associated with more stated accounting fraud cases than 
the others. It is in tune with La Porta et al. (2000), who noticed that the UK has conceiv-
ably the finest courts in the world, with the best and least unethical judiciaries. Moreover, as 
theoretically assumed, civil law countries have statistically, and significantly fewer reported 
fraud cases than the other common and mixed law countries. Hypothesis H4 can be accepted.
Table 2. Outcomes of the heteroscedasticity consistent (HAC) and corrected OLS regressions of Equa-
tion (1) in the examined countries in 2016 (source: calculations based on ACFE, 2016; Sol Ability, 2018; 
The World Bank, 2019; World Economic Forum, 2018)
Independent
Variables
Model 
1
Model 
2
Model 
3
Model 
4
Model 
5
Model 
6
Model 
7
Model 
8
Model 
9
Model 
10
Constant −9.209 −13.11 0.587 −1.992 −0.862 −9.966 −0.836 −9.763 −5.997 −14.11
  −3.13*** −4.93*** 3.18*** −1.25 −0.57 −5.18*** -1.01 −7.45*** −2.96*** −5.71***
ln(Auditing) 1.518 0.944         1.885   0.607 1.926
  2.09** 1.66*         3.61***   0.92 3.31***
ln(Governance) 2.219 3.161       3.153     –0.709 3.596
  2.69*** 4.41***       6.07***     –0.94 4.81***
ln(Liability)     0.223           0.258 −0.424
      2.16**           1.91* −1.45
ln(Freedom)       0.674 0.763       −0.405 −0.251
        1.88* 2.05**       −1.23 −1.65
English   1.907 0.993 1.541       1.226   1.891
    4.28*** 3.44*** 4.15***       2.73***   4.64***
French   0.946 0.464 0.744       0.441   1.041
    2.41** 2.01** 2.51**       1.01   2.84***
German   0.683 0.741 0.892       0.407   0.719
    1.77* 2.44** 3.06**       0.89   2.02**
Civil_law         −0.747 −0.807 −0.556      
          −2.61*** −2.98*** −2.09**      
ln(GDP)               0.419 0.419  
                8.64*** 6.41***  
Observations 95 89 95 93 93 93 90 89 95 89
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.302 0.191 0.137 0.077 0.283 0.174 0.477 0.441 0.463
VIF 1.171 8.457 8.381 8.394 1.031 1.072 1.008 7.833 2.041 8.478
c2 test 17.38*** 5.61* 10.99*** 10.52*** 11.54*** 8.29** 8.59** 3.74* 3.55* 6.61*
F test 9.58*** 8.63*** 5.31*** 4.66*** 4.85*** 19.2*** 10.3*** 21.11*** 15.87*** 9.98***
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust (HC) t-statistics are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer 
to significance: ***: significance at 1 per cent, **: 5 per cent, *: 10 per cent. P-values without an index 
mean that the coefficient is not significant, even at the 10 per cent level.
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Otherwise, the extent of directors’ liability is also positively associated with the depen-
dent (log of) fraud variables in the linear regression models. From this perspective, an in-
creased level of directors’ liability positively affects the number of cases of crime reported. 
This result may be in accordance with the interests of shareholders who expect a sustained 
return on their investment (Sutopo, Kot, Adiati, & Lina Nur Ardila, 2018). In addition, the 
stronger investor protection institutions influence the financial reporting environment in 
that the market reactions to the stated annual earnings are built into prices (DeFond, Hung, 
& Trezevant, 2007).
In order to control for the size of countries, the influence of economic growth (log of 
GDP) was also examined, and the results highlighted that there is a strong relationship be-
tween the number of reported frauds and the income level. According to the empirical lit-
erature, the GDP and the quality of the legal and accounting systems are inversely related 
to the level of corruption (Malagueno et al., 2010; Kimbro, 2002, etc.), while more control 
over corruption might decrease the number of fraud cases (Sadaf et al., 2018). Assuming that 
corruption is inversely related to the economic growth of a given country, an increased level 
of income positively influences the number of reported fraud cases.
Table 3. Outcomes of the heteroscedasticity consistent (HAC) and corrected OLS regressions of Equa-
tion (1) in the examined countries in 2014 (source: calculations based on ACFE, 2014; Sol Ability, 2018; 
The World Bank, 2019; World Economic Forum, 2018)
Independent
Variables
Model 
1
Model 
2
Model 
3
Model 
4
Model 
5
Model 
6
Model 
7
Model 
8
Model 
9
Model 
10
Constant −7.499 −8.668 0.905 0.189 1.738 −7.633 −1.766 −10.194 −9.193 −6.119
  −4.03*** −3.25*** 2.44** 2.95 3.87*** −3.28*** −2.37** −8.95*** −6.43*** −2.91***
ln(Auditing) 1.351 1.226         1.451   0.911 1.507
  2.53** 2.09**         2.95***   1.91* 4.24***
ln(Governance) 1.761 1.844       2.457       1.827
  3.31*** 2.61**       3.94***       3.63***
ln(Liability)     0.396   0.111       −0.062 −0.349
      1.81*   0.61       −0.61 −0.94
ln(Freedom)       −0.018           −0.017
        −0.11           −0.14
English   1.466   2.112     1.323 1.796    
    3.44***   5.62***     3.06*** 2.73***    
French   0.842   0.842     0.675 0.969    
    2.36**   1.01***     2.13** 2.16**    
German   0.985   1.454     1.153 1.001    
    2.65***   4.07***     3.01*** 2.23**    
Civil_law         −0.747 −0.679       −0.701
          −2.61*** −2.78**       −2.56**
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Independent
Variables
Model 
1
Model 
2
Model 
3
Model 
4
Model 
5
Model 
6
Model 
7
Model 
8
Model 
9
Model 
10
ln(GDP)               0.406 0.358  
                9.96*** 5.86***  
Observations 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.229 0.026 0.281 0.037 0.173 0.212 0.586 0.395 0.439
VIF 1.123 3.529 1.000 3.557 1.137 1.016 3.519 3.541 1.231 1.751
c2 test 11.16*** 8.36** 11.75*** 6.29** 7.15** 7.34** 9.79*** 3.54* 4.92* 6.91**
F test 13.41*** 6.01*** 3.26* 9.22*** 4.85*** 9.81*** 6.65*** 30.73*** 19.61*** 14.17***
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust (HC) t-statistics are in parentheses. Letters in the upper index refer 
to significance: ***: significance at 1 per cent, **: 5 per cent, *: 10 per cent. P-values without an index 
mean that the coefficient is not significant, even at the 10 per cent level.
4. Discussions
The importance and contribution of outcomes highlight that the former Fraud Triangle, 
Diamond, and Planned Behavioural Theories can lead to imprecise conclusions and implica-
tions. Cases of financial fraud do not occur in isolation but as a result of interaction between 
organizations and institutions in a macro-setting, of which organizations are merely a subset. 
Adding a macro perspective to financial fraud supports an appreciation of the “big picture”, 
thus taking into account the process of detection and deterrence from individual to organiza-
tional and institutional level (Bradshaw, 2014). Consequently, the perspective of institutional 
economics is a comprehensive approach that can consider the complexity of financial crime 
so as to guide forthcoming academic research.
The concepts of accountability, control, audit, and governance are interlinked and can be 
aligned to the broader function of the firm’s corporate governance environment. Corporate 
sustainability can be determined as the capability of enterprises to influence, for example 
ultimately, ecosystems (preserving natural resources, reducing pollution), society (supporting 
other citizens, generating employment), economic development (distributing wealth through 
dividends, paying fair salaries) and governance practices. Based on this point of view, enter-
prises realize the enhanced need for corporate and social responsibility (CSR) towards stock-
holders and potential investors , executive (CEO) managers, staff members, clients, commer-
cial partners, the natural environment and broader society, including national communities 
and organizations serving the public (Hopkins, 2003; Stonkutė, Vveinhardt, & Sroka, 2018). 
Hence, the development of a sustainable management framework covers an effective pol-
icy solution including the complete cycle of anti‐fraud activities comprising fraud preven-
tion, detection, and response. Fraud prevention and deterrence are less expensive and time-
consuming than the extensive process of fraud detection, investigation, and prosecution. 
One of the essential elements of fraud assessment is analysing the profile and motivation of 
potential fraudsters, and estimating the total risk of fraud relating to the business. However, 
this pre-emptive identification of the causes is also essential to make fraud deterrence more 
effective (European Court of Auditors, 2017).
End of Table 3
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Sustainable government discipline potentially serves as an alternative mechanism to en-
sure high-quality audits. Currently, the European Securities and Markets Authority is making 
some efforts towards harmonization; in particular, to establish a cross-jurisdictional account-
ing enforcement regime. In the field of management misconduct, e.g., the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act (SOX) has a prominent role in developing a firm’s ethical and financial reporting process 
(Ahluwalia, Ferrell, Ferrell, & Rittenburg, 2018) by the enhanced integrity financial reports 
of firms which implement SOX rules intensively. Thus, other public institutions and legal 
agreements, such as the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), and the Commission’s Anti-
Fraud Strategy (CAFS) are designed to increase anticipation, and support the exploration 
of corruption, fraud, etc. and other prohibited events impacting on the financial interests of 
business life.
The findings seems to be similar to the results of Tang, Chen, and Lin (2016), where 
the strong legal enforcement system of the countries with developed capital markets have 
enhanced the quality of financial reporting in a cross-country analysis. As DeZoort and Har-
rison (2018) also reported, auditors under accountability pressure should be responsible for 
increased levels of fraud detection and have less variation in perceived responsibility than 
any anonymous auditor. Malagueno, Albrecht, Ainge, and Stephens (2010) also reported 
that the regulated accounting and auditing environment is shaped by perceived corruption 
of the country, and found strong empirical evidence that the support of better governance is 
related to reduced corruption as a lack of transparency facilitates forms of illicit behaviour. 
Corruption involves a financial payment in the form of a bribe, fraud, kickback, or theft, and 
the extended function of sustainable governance is to check on the accuracy of the auditing 
mechanism to prevent and discourage financial misappropriation (Kimbro, 2002).
The limitations of the estimations also need to be highlighted because these empirical re-
sults are only able to validate a few features of accounting fraud. Meanwhile, other elements, 
i.e. corruption, the rule of law, political stability, etc. which can also influence the number of 
reported fraud cases, have not been involved in the models, so the validity of conclusions is 
restricted by the omitted bias of a lack of data.
Conclusions
According to the results, it can be concluded that the greater strength of auditing and re-
porting, the liability of directors, independence from government control and effective gov-
ernance positively affect the number of reported fraud cases. Additionally, as one of the 
primary (political) institutional determinants, the legal origin is found to be essential, which 
also affects accounting frauds.
These outcomes also conclude that the disclosure requirements are more stringent in 
common law countries. Thus, the plaintiffs can be more easily proven wrongdoing in a court 
of common law countries than in civil law ones. However, English courts do not adjudicate in 
the case of a “bad bargain”, but intervene in cases of fraud. In practice, directors are unlikely 
to face liability when the transaction is reviewed by independent financial and accounting 
specialists and is approved by shareholders. Hence, these countries’ legal mechanisms defend 
minority shareholders against cruel actions by the controlling majority owners. These instru-
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ments comprise the right to either withdraw those transactions that are prejudicial to the 
enterprise or to recover damages suffered. 
In our opinion, the discovery of the features of fraud is a vital component in accounting 
analytics in terms of the support provided by governance strategies designed to resolve the 
undesirable consequences of financial downturns to reduce volatility in terms of government 
balance sheets, and exposure to shocks posed by financial market fluctuations. Moreover, 
we also believe that it is even more interesting to predict defaults than to react to them. In 
business life, the detection of fraud has become more comprehensive and complex as sophis-
ticated schemes have been developed to hide firms’ actual financial performance under the 
guise of “optimization” for local authorities. In this country-specific approach, further re-
search could be fruitful in these directions. Additional latent indicators should also be taken 
into account related to the role of corporate governance, e.g. conflict of interest, shareholder’s 
rights to board independence, enforcement of auditing, the extent of disclosure, etc.
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